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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are substantial di¤erences in the development of the unemployment rate
between OECD countries. Whereas from the 1960s to the early 1980s unemploy-
ment increased in every OECD country, since the early 1980s the development
diverges. For some countries unemployment kept on rising, for other countries
unemployment stabilized, while for again other countries unemployment went
down substantially. Table 1 gives an overview of these long term developments
in unemployment rates. It is shown that in the early 1960s unemployment rates
varied from close to zero in Switzerland to 5.7% in the United States. In the early
1980s the spread in unemployment rates was much wider. Then, unemployment
rates varied from 0.6% in Switzerland to 11.8% in Ireland. In the late 1990s the
spread was smaller, mainly because of an increase in unemployment in countries
that used to have a low unemployment rate. In the late 1990s unemployment
rates varied from 3.7% in Japan to 13.4% in Finland. Developments are quite
di¤erent between countries. Countries like Sweden and Switzerland have experi-
enced a small increase in their unemployment rates in the …rst period and a larger
increase in the second period. Countries like the Belgium, the UK, Denmark and
the Netherlands have experienced a substantial increase in their unemployment
in the …rst period, but a decline in the second period.
In this paper we focus on the relationship between unemployment and la-
bor market institutions.1 Labor market institutions interact with each other, i.e.
the institutional framework of a country is not a set of independent elements. As
Freeman (1998) stresses a particular institutional feature may perform di¤erently
depending on the overall institutional framework. The objective of this paper is
to investigate the existence of interactions between institutions in more detail.
We use a simple theoretical model that enables us to illustrate the mechanisms
through which institutions interact and in‡uence unemployment. We also inves-
tigate whether there is empirical evidence on the existence of complementarities.
Studies that try to establish the e¤ect on unemployment of institutions based
on cross country analysis are usually somewhat limited for two reasons. First,
institutions do not change frequently and cross-sectional variation only is insuf-
…cient to catch to true e¤ect of institutions. Second, there are many country
speci…c events that may a¤ect unemployment but which cannot all be taken into
account. Examples of such events are the German uni…cation, the large growth of
part-time labor in the Netherlands, the big EU subsidies for Ireland and the loss
1See Nickell and Layard (1999) for a general overview of the relationships between unem-
ployment and labor market institutions.of Eastern Europe exports for Finland.2 Despite these drawbacks we think that
our dataset is su¢ciently rich to establish the nature of the interactions between
institutions.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical
model of employment and wage determination. In section 3, we discuss the labor
market performances of OECD countries and relate these in a stylized way to
labor market institutions. In section 4, we present our empirical analysis based on
information from eighteen OECD countries, over the period 1960-1995. Because
we are interested in long term e¤ects we use averages over periods of …ve years.
In section 5 we conclude.
2 Theoretical background and related studies
2.1 Theoretical background
We use a simple model capturing the e¤ects of labor market institutions on the
unemployment rate.3 Our model is based on Layard and Nickell (1997), Bean
(1994) and Scarpetta (1996). The labor market is imperfectly competitive since
wages are determined by a bargaining process between representatives of the
employees and the employers. The commodity market is also imperfect. The
…rms face exogenously determined product market conditions and their capital
and technology is also predetermined.
We consider a simple right-to-manage model where nominal gross wages are
determined by a bargaining process. The …rms then choose employment so as
to maximize their pro…ts. While unemployed, workers search for a job with an
intensity that may depend on the replacement rate (½). Finally, at each period,
there is a positive probability of separation.
Within this framework labor demand (n) is a function of real wages (w ¡
p),w h e r ew stands for the gross wage and p for the price level, both taken in
logarithms; and a function of other ”push” institutional factors (Zn) such as
2Nickell and Van Ours (2000a, 2000b) give an explanation of the success of The Netherlands
and UK in reducing unemployment. They use the results from Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov et
al. (1998) and Nickell and Layard (1999) to indicate the quantitative impact of institutional
changes on the equilibrium unemployment rates in the Netherlands and the UK. They conclude
that much of the recent decline in equilibrium unemployment in both countries is due to a
combination of changes in the wage bargaining structures, the tax bene…t system and active
labor market policies.
3In a companion paper, Belot and Van Ours (2000), we present a more detailed theoretical
model.
3payroll taxes, employment protection and active labor market policy.
n = ¡®(w ¡ p) ¡ ¯nZn;w i t h ® > 0: (1)
The wage-setting schedule depends on institutional factors (Zw) that deter-
mine the bargaining position of the relative players. Workers have a better bar-
gaining position when unemployment bene…ts and union density are high. Work-
ers are more willing to concede wage increases when the employment protection
is strong. The structure of the bargaining system may also play a role. There
is a negative relationship between unemployment u and wages. The intuition is
that a higher unemployment rate weakens the bargaining position of the workers.
Finally, wages are bargained on the basis of the expected prices pe. If the actual
prices p di¤er from the expectations, the net wage will be a¤ected.
w = ¯wZw ¡ ±u+ ¸pe +( 1¡ ¸)p; (2)
where ¸ indicates to what extent nominal wages respond to expected or to
realized prices. That is because nominal wages will be …xed prior to the period
when the prices are revealed4. Therefore the real wage is equal to
w ¡ p = ¯wZw ¡ ±u+ ¸(pe ¡ p); (3)
If we assume that price surprises (p¡pe) are synonymous with changes in in‡ation
(¢2p), we …nd
w ¡ p = ¯wZw ¡ ±u¡ ¸¢
2p; (4)
We assume that the labor supply decision depends on factors a¤ecting par-
ticipating decisions (Zp) and factors pushing the wages up (indirect participating
e¤ects) Zw:
l = ¯pZp + ¯wZw; (5)
Unemployment is equal to the di¤erence between the labor supply (l) and the
employment (n).
u = l ¡ n; (6)
Substituting for l; n and w :
u = ¯pZp + ¯wZw + ®(¯wZw ¡ ±u¡ ¸¢
2p)+¯nZn; (7)
4If nominal wages react immediately to prices, ¸ will be zero.
4The unemployment equation is therefore:
u =
¯pZp + ¯nZn +( ® +1 ) ¯wZw ¡ ®¸¢2p
1+®±
; (8)
which we rewrite as
u = ¯Zj + °4
2p (9)
where the subscript j refers to the type of labor market institution and °<0.
Equation (11) indicates that the level of unemployment depends on labor market
institutions and the change in in‡ation. The equilibrium level of unemployment
(42p =0 ) only depends on labor market institutions.
2.2 Related studies
Nickell (1997 and 1998) constitutes a starting point to our empirical study. Nick-
ell (1997) considers 20 OECD countries taking averages over two time periods :
1983-8 and 1989-94. From his analysis, he concludes that …nancial incentives for
unemployed such as the replacement rate and bene…t duration a¤ect unemploy-
ment. Active labor market policies a¤ect unemployment and characteristics of
the wage determination system also play a signi…cant role. Union density and
union coverage are pushing the unemployment rate upwards. On the other hand,
coordination between unions and employers stimulate labor market performance.
Finally, labor taxes increase total unemployment, while none of the indicators
of labor market rigidity (employment protection regulation, labor taxes) has a
signi…cant e¤ect. In the 1998 study, Nickell includes the owner occupation rate as
additional regressor. The coe¢cients related to the other variables are however
barely di¤erent from the ones on the 1997 study.
Scarpetta (1996) considers 15 to 17 OECD countries over the 1983-1993 pe-
riod focusing on the OECD structural unemployment rate. The main conclusion
is that institutions matter and play an important role in the persistence of unem-
ployment. In a dynamic formulation of the model Scarpetta adds variables such
as the terms of trade, assumed to play an important role in small open economies.
For the rest, the variables taken into consideration are quite similar to the ones
used by Nickell. Scarpetta …nds di¤erent results however, with respect to labor
taxes (no signi…cant e¤ect) and the employment protection regulation (signi…-
cant positive e¤ect). The latter result also contrasts with Bertola (1992) who
was also unable to …nd any relationship between unemployment levels and em-
ployment adjustment costs. Further, Scarpetta …nds support for the hump-shape
5hypothesis associated with the degree of centralization (Calmfors and Dri¢ll,
1988). Interest rates and terms of trade do not have any signi…cant e¤ect on
long run labor market conditions. Regarding the role of institutions on the per-
sistence of unemployment, Scarpetta …nds that generous unemployment bene…ts,
employment protection and high degree of unionization extend the adjustment
period.
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) extend the previous analysis by con-
sidering a larger number of countries, taking the recent institutional developments
into account (in particular, evolutions of collective bargaining structures and em-
ployment protection legislation) and testing the existence of potential interactions
between policies or institutional factors. The main conclusion is that successful
countries might owe their success to reforms directed at insiders. In particular,
the tightening of eligibility conditions and the reduction of unemployment ben-
e…ts, as well as the easing up of …xed term contracts regulation might have had
a determinant in‡uence. The authors build a new indicator characterizing the
wage setting system, summarizing the degree of centralization and the degree of
coordination. Assuming that in countries where the degree of centralization is
medium (negotiations mainly at the industry level), coordination among actors
might be particularly crucial, they upgrade countries with medium level of cen-
tralization and high degree of coordination. Elmeskov et al. also …nd empirical
support for the interaction e¤ects hypothesis. First, the average tax wedge and
the employment protection regulation push the structural unemployment rate at
a higher level in countries with intermediary level of corporatism. Further, un-
employment bene…ts are likely to have a higher e¤ect in countries with relatively
high levels of active labor market policy expenditures. And it appears that the
degree of employment protection does not matter for the e¤ect of unemployment
bene…ts, while they would have expected the e¤ect of unemployment bene…t to
be higher in countries with high employment protection, the bargaining power of
t h ew o r k e r sa s s u m e dt ob eb i g g e r .
Finally, Daveri and Tabellini (1997) look at complementarities between la-
bor taxes and the nature of collective arrangements. Their analysis concerns 14
countries over the period 1965-1991. They …nd empirical support for a correla-
tion between the negative e¤ect of labor taxes on labor market performances and
the nature of organization of the workers. Decentralized or centralized countries
have lower unemployment rates, irrespective of the level of labor taxes.
62.3 Interactions
The basic argument of this paper is that the role of each institution depends
on the rest of the institutional framework. Hence, the e¤ect of an institutional
reform might produce di¤erent e¤ects according to the other institutions present.
There are multiple mechanisms by which institutions might interact with each
other. Calmfors (1993) shows how in theory the e¤ect of taxes di¤er according
to nature of the bargaining institutions. Coe and Snower (1997) investigate the
channels through which labor market institutions could interact with each other.
One example of a channel is the interdependence between the search intensities
of the workers and employers, looking for each other on the labor market. Hence,
the unemployment bene…t system gives less incentives to the workers to look
for a job and therefore discourages vacancy posting. Another institution, such
as the employment protection legislation, discourages vacancy posting and so
reduces the search intensity of the workers since the likelihood of …nding a job
is smaller. Hence, the presence of both institutions (unemployment bene…ts and
employment protection) in the same time ampli…es their respective e¤ect on the
unemployment rate. In the same line of reasoning, they also claim that ”the
more generous are passive unemployment policies, the less e¤ective will be the
active unemployment policies”. Fitoussi et. al. (1998) underline that all recently
successful countries have in common the implementation of a set of comprehensive
reforms. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show that institutions and shocks interact
with each other. Hence, they argue that similar shocks can have very di¤erent
e¤ect on the unemployment, depending on the labor market institutions.
We distinguish between interactions within the system of …nancial incentives,
labor taxes and unemployment bene…ts and interactions within the structure of
union bargaining, with indicators union density, level of bargaining and employ-
ment protection.
The essence of the interaction is that the e¤ect of one institutional parameter
may depend on the value of other parameters. Labor taxes for example weaken
the bargaining position of the workers. However, they are linked positively with
the unemployment bene…ts, through a social security budget constraint. Hence,
in general, when unemployment bene…ts are generous, tax rates are high. The
similar holds for the interactions between the characteristics of the bargaining
system. Union density should according to our predictions have a more damag-
ing e¤ect in systems where unions have a favorable bargaining position, such as
decentralized and uncoordinated economies.
Of course, there can also be interactions between the two sets of institutions.
The e¤ects of changes in replacement rates and labor taxes may depend on the
7structure of the bargaining system. Calmfors (1993) and Elmeskov et al. (1999)
argue for example that the e¤ect of taxes should di¤er according to the degree
of corporatism. Hence, the e¤ect of taxes on unemployment would be stronger
in medium-centralized economies. Daveri and Tabellini (1997) argue that these
economies are characterized by a high insider power such that workers are able
to resist the transfer of the tax burden on labor. In highly centralized economies,
unions take into account the e¤ect of such a behavior on the outsiders, i.e. since
labor demand decreases when employers bear the burden of payroll taxes, the
unemployment would be higher.
3 Stylized facts on institutions
In our analysis we use data of 18 industrial countries over the period 1960-1994,
which we group into 7 …ve years periods to remove the e¤ect of cyclical ‡uctua-
tions. Table 2 shows that averaged over the countries involved the unemployment
rate steadily increases from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, to decrease some-
what in the late 1990s.
Our data cover a period of 35 years. Unfortunately, some labor market institu-
tions cannot be included in our analysis because there is only recent information
about them. The most important of these institutions are the minimum wage, ac-
tive labor market policies and …nancial incentives for unemployed other than the
replacement rate.5 These other institutions refer to bene…t durations and ben-
e…t sanctions. Longer bene…t durations induce workers to search less intensive.
Bene…t sanctions are a recent phenomenon. Workers that collect unemployment
bene…ts have to comply with administrative rules. In many countries to remain
eligible for unemployment bene…ts, workers have to be available to start work
at short notice, they have to provide proof of job search e¤orts (e.g. recent job
applications), they are not allowed to reject job o¤ers too easily and they have to
attend interviews and training courses as required by the public employment ser-
vices.6 These eligibility criteria may be enforced by imposing bene…t sanctions.7
5Another variable is the home ownership rate. As discussed before, Nickell (1998) included
this variable while Nickell (1997) did not. Nevertheless, the parameter estimates were very
similar. We introduce home ownership rate in our sensitivity analysis below and …nd similar
results.
6These eligibility criteria refer to behavior during bene…t periods. Apart from that, many
countries also have criteria with respect to the behavior before bene…ts starts, especially with
respect to e¤orts to prevent job loss.
7See Grubb (1999) for details on the system of bene…t sanctions in various countries and
Boone and Van Ours (2000) for an overview of potential e¤ects of bene…t sanctions.
8Table 2 shows that the average replacement rate has increased substantially
in the 1970s. Whereas averaged over the countries the replacement rate in the
late 1960s was 17.0 percent, in the early 1990 this was 27.5 percent. Taxes have
also increased from 26.8% in the late 1960s to 39.4% in the early 1990s.
Table 2 also shows that union density on average over the countries did not
change a lot in the past decades. Employment protection has decreased since the
mid 1980s.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Set-up of the analysis
Our empirical analysis is based on the relationship we derived in the theoretical
section to which we add subscripts for time period and country and error terms.
Furthermore, we generalize the e¤ect of labor market institutions to allow for
interactions:
ui;t = ®i + ®t + ¯Zi;t + °4
2pi;t + "i;t (10)
where u is the unemployment rate, Z refers to labor market institutions, p is the
price level, the index i refers to the country and the index t refers to the 5-years
time periods. Note that interactions between labor market institutions may be
included in Z. Furthermore, the ®0
i s are country …xed e¤ects, the ®0
t are time
period …xed e¤ects, the vector ¯ and ° represent coe¢cients of interest and " is
an error term that is i.i.d.
We are interested in the direct e¤ects of institutions on unemployment, but
also in possible interactions. We consider the interaction between the two indi-
cators for …nancial incentives, taxes and replacement rate, and the interaction
between the union bargaining institutions, union density, employment protection
and the level of bargaining in more detail.
4.2 Parameter estimates
T h e… r s tc o l u m no ft h eu p p e rp a r to fT a b l e3p r e s e n t st h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t si f
we do not include country …xed e¤ects nor time period …xed e¤ects. Then, we
…nd that the unemployment rate is positively in‡uenced by taxes, replacement
rates and union density. Employment protection and centralization have a neg-
ative in‡uence on unemployment. The e¤ects are straightforward. A 10%-point
9higher tax rate is related to a 1.2%-point higher unemployment rate. A 10%-
point higher replacement rate is related to a 0.7%-point higher unemployment
rate. Employment protection is a variable that ranges from 0 to 1. Therefore,
these estimation results would imply that the di¤erence in unemployment rate
caused by employment protection is at most 3%-points. A 10%-point increase
in union density is related to a 0.6%-point increase in the unemployment rate.
Finally, since the centralization variable ranges from 1 to 3, the unemployment
rate under a system of …rm bargaining is 5%-points higher than it is under cen-
tralized bargaining. The e¤ect of the change in in‡ation is signi…cantly negative,
according to our expectations.
The parameter estimates in the …rst column are based on a mixture of cross-
sectional and time series variation. To investigate to what extent changes in labor
market institutions are responsible for the evolution of unemployment rates, we
introduce both period …xed e¤ects and country …xed e¤ects. The second column
of the upper part of Table 3 shows the new parameter estimates. Now, none of
the labor market institutions has a signi…cant e¤ect on the unemployment rate.
The coe¢cient of the change in in‡ation is hardly a¤ected by the introduction
of the …xed e¤ects. The results with respect to the relationship between labor
market institutions and unemployment in the …rst column seem to be caused by
…xed di¤erences between countries and time periods and not by within country
changes in labor market institutions. However, sofar we only accounted for direct
e¤ects of institutions on unemployment.
The lower part of Table 3 shows what happens if we allow for interactions
between labor market institutions. Since the replacement rate and the tax rate
are continuous variables we directly introduce an interaction term. Our central-
ization variable is to a large extent discrete. Therefore, we consider interaction by
investigating the e¤ect of employment protection and union density for di¤erent
bargaining regimes. As shown in the …rst column in the lower part of Table 3,
there is a positive interaction between the tax rate and the replacement rate. The
e¤ect of the replacement rate on the unemployment rate is larger when taxes are
high. Of the coe¢cients on employment protection, allowed to be di¤erent for
each bargaining regime, only the one at the decentralized bargaining level di¤ers
signi…cantly from zero. The relationship between union density and unemploy-
ment rate also depends on the bargaining structure. When there is decentralized
bargaining an increase in union density causes unemployment rate to increase.
When there is industry level or centralized bargaining there is no relationship
between union density and unemployment.
In the second column of the lower part of Table 3 it is shown that the pa-
10rameter estimates hardly change if we omit the insigni…cant coe¢cients. The
estimation results presented imply that the e¤ect of the replacement rate (½)o n
the unemployment rate depends on the tax rate (¿) and vice versa. For the e¤ect
of replacement rate on unemployment we have @u
@½ = ¡0:21 + 0:51¿.S o ,i ts e e m s
like as if only at high tax rates an increase in the replacement rate increases
unemployment. For the e¤ect of the tax rate on unemployment rate we have
@u
@¿ =0 :51b; which implies that the e¤ect on unemployment of a reduction in
tax rates is larger if the replacement rate is higher. Employment protection and
union density only have an e¤ect under a system of decentralized bargaining. If
there is such a system, more employment protection reduces unemployment, a
higher union density increases unemployment.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we present the results of a simple sensitivity analyses by intro-
ducing home ownership rate as an additional explanatory variable. This variable
has been advocated by Oswald (1997, 1999) as an explanation for the rise in
unemployment in many European countries. A high home ownership rate may
be responsible for a high unemployment rate because homeowners are relatively
immobile.
The third column in the upper part of Table 3 shows that if we only consider
direct e¤ects of institutions the home ownership variable has a signi…cant positive
e¤ect on unemployment even if we allow for country …xed e¤ects and time period
…xed e¤ects. If we introduce the home ownership rate in the estimates where
we allow for interactions between institutions we also …nd a signi…cant positive
e¤ect. However, as shown in the third column of the lower part of Table 3 the
introduction of the home ownership variable hardly a¤ects the other parameter
estimates. From this we conclude that home ownership rates may be a determi-
nant of unemployment rates, but this is additional to the e¤ects of traditional
labor market institutions. Finally, the fourth column of the lower part of Table
3 shows what happens to the parameter estimates if we omit the country …xed
e¤ects and the calendar time …xed e¤ects. In this case we still …nd positive e¤ects
of the tax rate and the replacement rate although the e¤ect of the interaction
between the two is vanished. We also still …nd an e¤ect of employment protection
and union density, both under a system of decentralized bargaining. The home
ownership rate has a similar e¤ect as before.
115 Conclusions
There is an obvious di¤erence in labor market performance between OECD coun-
tries in particular in terms of the evolution of unemployment rates. The main
question we address in this paper is to what extent labor market institutions
are responsible for this. We investigate the relationship between unemployment
rate and labor market institutions in particular tax rate, replacement rate, em-
ployment protection, union density, level of bargaining. We investigate both
the direct e¤ects of institutions and interactions between them. Our empirical
analysis shows that interaction e¤ects are important.
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146 Data appendix
6.1 De…nition and sources
- Change in in‡ation: Absolute annual change in in‡ation, the latter de…ned
as the relative increase in consumer prices. Source: Consumer price index, Lux-
embourg Income Study.
- Tax rate: Employment tax rate + Direct tax rate.
- Employment tax rate: Indicator previously computed by the Centre for Eco-
nomic Performance (London School of Economics), de…ned as the ratio between
the sum of employers’ contributions to social security contributions and contri-
butions to private pension schemes (when applicable) and the compensation of
employees net of these contributions. Source: CEP (1960-1992), OECD, National
Accounts (1993-1996).
- Direct tax rate: Indicator previously computed by the Centre for Economic
Performance (London School of Economics), de…ned as the ratio between the sum
of households’ contributions to social security net the employers’ contributions
and the income taxes, and the households’ current receipts. Source: CEP (1960-
1992), OECD, National Accounts (1993-1996).
- Replacement rate: Ratio between the unemployment bene…t and the median
wage. The indicator used for the unemployment bene…t is a summary indicator,
taking into account various durations and family situations. The ratio has been
directly computed by OECD. Only odd years were available. We have computed
even years by linear interpolation.
- Employment protection: Built index indicating the strictness of employment
regulation with respect to open-ended contracts, …xed-term (FT) contracts and
temporary work agencies (TWA). See below.
- Centralization index: Index (1-3) characterizing the degree of centralization
of the collective bargaining system, according to the privileged level of bargaining:
1:…rm level, 2:industry level, 3:national level. Source: Bratt (1996), OECD, Em-
ployment Outlook (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1997). Some countries have changed
bargaining regime in the period of analysis. On an annual basis this is a discrete
jump between 1, 2 or 3. However, because we use …ve years periods the value of
the centralization variable may be between two discrete values. If that was the
case we rounded the value to 1, 2 or 3.
- Union density: union density using OECD data, source CEP.
- Home ownership: from Blanch‡ower and Oswald who have 10 years intervals,
which we transferred to 5 years intervals through interpolation.
15The mean, minimum and maximum values and the standard deviation of the
variables are:
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard dev.
u 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.04
¢2p 0.02 -3.90 3.60 1.07
Tax rate 0.33 0.06 0.58 0.12
Replacement rate 0.22 0.00 0.63 0.14
Employment protection 0.43 0 1 0.29
Union density 0.45 0.09 0.87 0.16
Centralization 1.94 1 3 0.64
Home ownership 0.53 0.28 0.81 0.13
6.2 Key for the building of the employment protection
indicator
6.2.1 Protection of open-ended contracts
Administrative procedure
The marks are added up according to the presence of the mentioned factors.
1 - Noti…cation required (verbally or by letter)
1 - Grounds noti…cation required (verbally or by letter)
1 - Noti…cation to a third party required
2 - Authorization of a third party
Noticing period
0 - No noti…cation period required
1-< 2m o n t h s
2-> 2m o n t h s
Severance payment
0 - No noti…cation period required
1-< 2m o n t h s
2-> 2m o n t h s
Special provisions
1 - Tighter protection of special categories of workers
2 - Companies must provide retraining courses
De…nition of unfair dismissals (and provisions with respect to it)
0 - Discrimination and no economic grounds
1 - when social considerations haven’t been taken into account
1 - when discrimination in the selection procedure of dismissals
161 - when no consultation with the workforce has been undertaken
2 - when re-training the labor force must be attempted
3 - when worker capability cannot be a basis for dismissal
-1 - when a ceiling apply to appeal against unfair dismissal
Collective dismissals (special provisions)
1 - Conciliation with workforce / third party required
1 - redundancies must be accompanied by a social plan
2 - authorization of a third party required
2 - when speci…c conditions must be ful…lled
6.2.2 Regulation of …xed-term contracts
Purpose
0 - No limit
1 - Speci…c restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 - Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary re-
placement of a worker)
2 - Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 - Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4 - Not allowed
-1 - If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist oth-
erwise)
Duration
0 - No limit
1 - Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2 - no renewal possible
6.2.3 Temporary work agencies regulation
Purpose
0 - No limit
1 - Speci…c restrictions (some jobs ore sectors are excluded)
2 - Particular circumstances (increase in the amount of work, temporary re-
placement of a worker)
2 - Wide restrictions (limited to some jobs or sectors)
3 - Objective reasons (task temporary in nature)
4 - Not allowed
-1 - If can be used for unemployed and apprentices (if restrictions exist oth-
erwise)
17Duration
0 - No limit
1 - Limited to 1 year, only few renewals possible
2 - no renewal possible
We graded the evolution of the employment regulation for all the countries, over
the period 1960-1996 . We then calculated three indicators, averaging the grades
related to each component described above. We normalized the highest value for
each indicator to 1, so as to re-scale our indicators in a range [0,1]. We then
calculated the average of the three indicators to obtain the summary index of
employment protection
18Table 1 Unemployment rates by time perioda)
1960/64 1980/84 1995/99
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(1) (3)-(2)
Australia 2.6 7.4 8.1 4.7 0.7
Austria 2.2 3.2 4.2 1.0 1.1
Belgium 2.2 11.5 9.3 9.3 -2.2
Canada 5.6 9.8 8.9 4.2 -1.0
Denmark 1.8 9.7 6.4 7.9 -3.3
Finland 1.4 5.2 13.4 3.9 8.2
France 1.4 8.2 11.9 6.8 3.7
Germany 0.7 6.1 9.0 5.4 2.9
Ireland 5.0 11.8 9.6 6.8 -2.2
Italy 5.1 8.8 11.9 3.7 3.1
Japan 1.4 2.4 3.7 1.0 1.3
Netherlands 1.1 10.1 5.1 9.0 -5.0
Norway 1.1 2.6 4.1 1.5 1.5
New Zealand 0.1 4.2 6.7 4.1 2.5
Sweden 1.6 2.8 8.9 1.3 6.1
Switzerland 0.0 0.6 4.8 0.5 4.2
United Kingdom 1.5 9.6 7.3 8.1 -2.3
United States 5.7 8.3 4.9 2.6 -3.4
a) The numbers refer to 5 years averages
19Table 2 Five years averages over countries for di¤erent time periods
Unempl. Union Repl. rate Tax rate Empl. prot.
rate (%) density (%) (%) (%) (%)
1960/64 2.3 43.6 16.2 23.1 43.2
1965/69 2.2 43.7 17.0 26.8 43.4
1970/74 2.6 44.4 19.6 31.3 44.3
1975/79 4.5 46.3 24.0 35.4 44.4
1980/84 6.8 47.3 25.7 37.3 44.2
1985/89 7.1 44.7 27.1 38.6 40.4
1990/94 8.1 42.6 27.5 39.4 39.7
1995/99 7.7
20Table 3 Estimation resultsa)
a. direct e¤ects
(1) (2) (3)
Tax rate (¿) 0.12 (4.1)¤¤ 0.03 (0.4) -0.07 (1.0)
Replacement rate (½) 0.71 (4.1)¤¤ 0.05 (0.2) -0.04 (0.2)
Employment protection -0.34 (3.0)¤¤ -0.10 (0.3) -0.16 (0.5)
Union density 0.59 (2.8)¤¤ 0.11 (0.3) -0.11 (0.3)
Centralization -0.26 (6.1)¤¤ -0.08 (1.1) -0.12 (1.4)
Home ownership - - 0.19 (4.2)¤¤
¢2p (%) -0.69 (2.7)¤¤ -0.63 (2.6)¤¤ -0.51 (2.2)¤¤
R
2 0.394 0.781 0.817
Fixed e¤ects no yes yes
b. direct e¤ects and interactions
Direct e¤ects (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax rate (¿) -0.08 (1.0) - - 0.11 (3.2)¤¤
Replacement rate (½) -2.14 (3.5)¤¤ -2.07 (4.1)¤¤ -1.92 (3.9)¤¤ 1.09 (1.8)¤
Home ownership - - 0.14 (3.8)¤¤ 0.16 (7.0)¤¤
Interactions
¿:½ 5.46 (3.5)¤¤ 5.12 (4.5)¤¤ 4.79 (4.6)¤¤ -0.76 (0.5)
Empl. protectionjcen=1 -0.75 (2.0)¤¤ -1.20 (4.2)¤¤ -0.88 (2.7)¤¤ -0.47 (4.6)¤¤
Empl. protectionjcen=2 0.61 (1.7) - - -
Empl. protectionjcen=3 0.56 (0.9) - - -
Union densityjcen=1 1.68 (3.8)¤¤ 1.57 (4.2)¤¤ 1.16 (2.9)¤¤ 1.00 (4.2)¤¤
Union densityjcen=2 0.11 (0.3) - - -
Union densityjcen=3 0.04 (0.1) - - -
¢2p (%) -0.57 (2.3)¤¤ -0.54 (2.2)¤¤ -0.48 (2.3)¤¤ -0.58 (2.7)¤¤
R
2 0.835 0.832 0.849 0.597
Fixed e¤ects yes yes yes no
a) The estimates are based on 119 observations; absolute t-values (based on
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors) in parentheses. The coe¢cients of
the replacement rate, employment protection, union density and centralization
should be divided by 10. ¤ (¤¤) = signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at 10% (5%)
level
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